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ABSTRACT. Considering congestion games with uncertain delays, we compute the inefficiency introduced in
network routing by risk-averse agents. At equilibrium, agents may select paths that do not minimize the ex-
pected latency so as to obtain lower variability. A social planner, who is likely to be more risk neutral than agents
because it operates at a longer time-scale, quantifies social cost with the total expected delay along routes. From
that perspective, agents may make suboptimal decisions that degrade long-term quality. We define the price of
risk aversion (PRA) as the worst-case ratio of the social cost at a risk-averse Wardrop equilibrium to that where
agents are risk-neutral. For networks with general delay functions and a single source-sink pair, we show that
the PRA depends linearly on the agents’ risk tolerance and on the degree of variability present in the network.
In contrast to the price of anarchy, in general the PRA increases when the network gets larger but it does not
depend on the shape of the delay functions. To get this result we rely on a combinatorial proof that employs
alternating paths that are reminiscent of those used in max-flow algorithms. For series-parallel (SP) graphs, the
PRA becomes independent of the network topology and its size. As a result of independent interest, we prove
that for SP networks with deterministic delays, Wardrop equilibria maximize the shortest-path objective among
all feasible flows.
KEYWORDS: Congestion Game, Stochastic Networks, Risk-averse Wardrop Equilibrium, Mean-Stdev Risk
Measure, Mean-Var Risk Measure, Nash Equilibrium, Stochastic Selfish Routing.
1. INTRODUCTION
A central question in decision making is how to make good decisions under uncertainty, in particular
when decision makers are risk averse. Applications of crucial national importance, including alleviating
congestion in transportation networks, as well as improving telecommunications, robotics, security and
others, all face pervasive uncertainty and often require finding reliable or risk-minimizing solutions. Those
applications have motivated the development of algorithms that incorporate risk primitives, and the inclusion
of risk aversion in questions related to algorithmic game theory. While risk has been extensively studied in
the fields of finance and operations, among others, in comparison there is relatively little literature in the
theoretical computer science community devoted to this issue. One of the goals of this paper is to inspire
more work devoted to understanding and mitigating risk in networked systems.
Capturing uncertainty and risk aversion in traditional combinatorial problems studied by theoretical com-
puter science often reduces to nonlinear or nonconvex optimization over combinatorial feasible sets, for
which no efficient algorithms are known. Possibly due to the difficulty in writing the ensuing problems in
simple terms, at present we lack a systematic understanding of how risk considerations can be successfully
incorporated into classic combinatorial problems. Doing so would necessitate new techniques for analyzing
risk-minimizing combinatorial structures rigorously.
Within the fields of algorithms and algorithmic game theory, routing has proved to be a pervasive source
of important questions. Indeed, many fundamental questions on risk-averse routing are still open, including
several intriguing cases where the complexity is unknown. For example, in a network with uncertain edge
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delays, what is the complexity of finding the path with highest probability of reaching the destination within
a given deadline? What is the path that minimizes the mean delay plus the standard deviation along that
path? The best known algorithms for both of these questions have a polynomial runtime and smoothed
complexity, but a subexponential worst-case running time (Nikolova et al. 2006b, Nikolova 2010). Hence,
these problems are unlikely to be NP-hard, yet polynomial algorithms have so far been elusive. There are
also a myriad of other possible risk objectives, yielding nonlinear and nonconvex optimization problems
over the path polytope, that are open from a complexity, algorithmic and approximation point of view.
Consequently, we are at the very beginning of understanding risk and designing appropriate models in
routing games, which have been instrumental in the development of algorithmic game theory in the past two
decades. Routing games capture decision-making by multiple agents in a networking context, internaliz-
ing the congestion externalities generated by self-minded agents. Externalities are traditionally captured by
considering that edge delays are functions of the edge flow. In addition to the technical challenges involv-
ing the characterization and computation of equilibria, a key insight brought by the study of these games
was that equilibria are not extremely inefficient. The price of anarchy—by now a widely studied concept
used in a variety of problems and applications—represents the worst-case ratio between the cost of a Nash
equilibrium and the cost of the socially-optimal solution. This ratio, which quantifies the degradation of
system performance due to selfish behavior, was first defined in the context of routing and applied to a net-
work with parallel links (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 2009). It was subsequently analyzed for general
networks and different types of players (Roughgarden and Tardos 2002, Roughgarden 2003, Correa et al.
2004, 2008). With few exceptions, this stream of work has assumed that delays are deterministic, while
almost every practical situation in which such games could be useful presents uncertainty. For instance,
there are uncertain delays in a transportation network due to weather, accidents, traffic lights, etc., and in
telecommunications networks due to changing demand, hardware failures, interference, packet retransmis-
sions, etc.
Risk Model. A generalization of the classic selfish routing model introduced by Beckmann et al. (1956) to
the case of uncertain delays is to associate every edge to a random variable whose distribution depends on
the edge flow. The problem faced by a risk-averse agent becomes more involved since it is not merely finding
the shortest path with respect to delays. To find the best route, agents must consider both the expected delay
and the variability along all possible choices, leading them to solve stochastic shortest path problems. For
instance, it is common that commuters add a buffer to the expected travel time for their trip to maximize the
chance of arriving on-time to an important meeting or to a flight at the airport. A classic model in finance
that captures the tradeoff between mean and variability is Markowitz’ mean-risk framework (Markowitz
1952). It considers an agent that optimizes a linear combination of mean and risk, weighted by a risk-
aversion coefficient that quantifies the degree of risk aversion of that agent. In the context of routing,
Nikolova and Stier-Moses (2014) adapted that framework to Wardrop equilibria, showed the existence of
equilibria, and computed efficiency indicators such as the price of anarchy.
Of course, there are multiple ways to capture risk. The expected utility theory Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944), which is prevalent in economics, captures risk-averse preferences using concave utility functions.
This theory has been criticized due to unrealistic assumptions such as independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives so other theories have been proposed (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman (1981)). The theory of coherent risk
measures, proposed in the late nineties, takes an axiomatic approach to risk (e.g., see surveys Rockafellar
(2007), Krokhmal et al. (2011) and references therein). Cominetti and Torrico (2013) adapted these ideas
to the context of network routing and concluded that the mean-variance objective has benefits over other
risk measures in being additively consistent. In finance, the mean-risk and other traditional risk measures
have been criticized for leading to counterintuitive solutions such as preferring stochastically dominated so-
lutions. Nevertheless, different risk postulates may be relevant in the context of transportation and telecom-
munications. For instance, stochastically-dominated routes may be admissible if certainty is more valued
than a stochastically-dominant solution with large variance. Indeed, one may choose a larger-latency path
rather than routing along variable paths that introduce jitter in real-time communications. Following on
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our previous work on risk-averse congestion games, in this paper we consider both the mean-variance and
mean-standard deviation objectives for risk-averse routing.
It is important to note that risk aversion may induce agents to choose longer routes to reduce risk, effec-
tively trading off mean with variance. Hence, a natural question to ask for a network game with uncertain
delays and risk-averse agents is how much of the degradation in system performance can be attributed to the
agents’ risk-aversion. We refer to this degradation by the price of risk-aversion (PRA), which we formally
define as the worst-case ratio of the social cost of the equilibrium (with risk-averse agents) to that of an
equilibrium if agents were risk neutral. The rationale for choosing this particular ratio is that we want to
disentangle the effects caused by selfish behavior, captured by the price of anarchy, from those caused by
risk aversion per se. The social cost is considered with respect to average delays because a central planner
would typically care about a long-term perspective and minimize average agent delays and average pollutant
emissions.
Using the variance of delay along a route as a risk indicator, although not directly intuitive since it is not
expressed in the same units as the mean delay, leads to models that satisfy natural and intuitive optimality
conditions for routes; namely, a subpath of an optimal path remains optimal (called the additive consistency
property). Indeed, the mean-variance objective is additive along paths (the cost of a path is the sum of the
cost of its edges). It thus lends itself to tractable algorithms in terms of computing equilibria, at least as
long as delays are pairwise independent across edges. On the other hand, comparing a Wardrop equilibrium
with risk-averse players to a standard Wardrop equilibrium is far from straightforward and requires new
techniques for understanding how the two differ.
Alternatively, one could set the risk indicator to be the standard deviation of delays. A big advantage
is that the mean-standard deviation objective can be thought of as a quantile of delay, easily justifying
the buffer time that commuters consider when selecting when to start the trip. The disadvantages are that
additive consistency is lost and, technically, that to compute the standard deviation one must take a square
root, which makes the objective non-separable and nonconvex. For more details, we refer the reader to
Nikolova and Stier-Moses (2014), where these pros and cons are discussed in further detail.
Our results. We define a new concept, the price of risk aversion (PRA), as the worst-case ratio of the social
cost (total expected delay) of a risk-averse Wardrop equilibrium (RAWE) to that of a risk-neutral Wardrop
equilibrium (RNWE). Our main result, presented in Section 4, is a bound on the price of risk aversion for
arbitrary graphs with a single origin-destination (OD) pair and mean-variance risk minimizing players. We
provide a bound of 1 + γκη, where γ is the risk-aversion coefficient, κ is the maximum possible variability
(variance to mean ratio) of all edges when the prevailing traffic conditions are those under the equilibrium,
and η is a topological parameter that captures how many flow-bearing paths are needed to cover a special
structure called an alternating path. The parameter η strongly depends on the topology, and is at most half
the number of nodes in the network, ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉. The resulting bound is appealing in that it depends on
the three factors that one would have expected (risk aversion, variability and network size), but perhaps
unexpectedly does so in a linear way and for arbitrary delay functions. The proof of this result is based on a
novel idea of constructing a type of alternating path that switches between forward edges for which the flow
under a RAWE is less than or equal to the flow under a RNWE, and backward edges for which the opposite
inequality holds. This construction is the key that allows us to compare both equilibrium flows and derive
our main result.
The proof of the main result consists of three key lemmas that show that (a) an alternating path always
exists (Lemma 4.5), (b) the cost of a RAWE is upper-bounded by an inflated total mean delay along forward
edges minus the total mean delay along backward edges (Lemma 4.6), and (c) the cost of a RNWE is lower-
bounded by the total mean delay along forward edges minus the total mean delay along backward edges
(Lemma 4.7). Steps (a) and (c) are proved independently of the choice of risk model. Step (b) is more
subtle: it constructs a series of subpaths that connect different parts of the alternating path to the source and
the sink, and uses the equilibrium conditions to provide partial bounds for subpaths of the alternating path.
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The lemma then exploits the linearity of the mean-variance objective to get a telescopic sum that simplifies
precisely to the total delay along the alternating path.
Theorem 4.8 puts the lemmas together and upper bounds the total mean delay of the forward subpaths
in the alternating path by the cost of the RNWE times the number of such forward paths, obtaining the
factor η ≤ ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉ in the worst-case, as mentioned above. Although it is an open question whether
our bound is tight for general graphs, we prove that it is tight for two families of graphs. For series-parallel
(SP) graphs, it turns out that there must exist an alternating path that consists of only forward edges (that is,
η = 1), which implies that the price of risk-aversion for those topologies is exactly 1 + γκ (Corollary 4.11
and lower bound in Section 4.1). For Braess graphs, we establish that the price of risk aversion is bounded
by 1 + 2γκ and this bound is tight, as well.
As mentioned above, many of the results for the mean-variance risk model extend to the mean-stdev
objective. In particular, the only piece missing to prove a general theorem is an equivalent of Lemma 4.6,
which bounds the cost of the RAWE by an expression of the edge delays along the alternating path. The
difficulty in extending our current proof to general graphs is the nonlinearity of the mean-stdev cost func-
tion, which in turn puts a restriction on the equilibrium flow in that its edge-flow representation cannot
be decomposed arbitrarily to a path-flow representation. (The latter leads to an interesting open problem,
posed by Nikolova and Stier-Moses (2014): is there an efficient algorithm that converts a given equilibrium
edge-flow vector into an equilibrium path-flow decomposition? That reference shows that a succinct path
flow decomposition that uses polynomially-many paths exists.) Circumventing the nonlinearity challenge,
we are able to prove the equivalent of Lemma 4.6 on the Braess graph with a more involved case analysis
(Lemma 5.6). Henceforth, we establish that the exact value of the price of risk aversion for Braess graphs in
the mean-stdev case match those in the mean-variance case.
The independence of the network topology property for SP graphs also extends to the mean-stdev case.
To obtain that extension, we provide a result for SP graphs that is interesting in its own right. As discussed
earlier, it has already been established that RNWE are typically not extremely inefficient because the price
of anarchy is bounded. We prove that considering SP graphs with deterministic delays, the equilibrium
maximizes the shortest path objective among all feasible flows (Theorem 5.9). In other words, the shortest
path for an arbitrary flow can never be longer than the shortest path for the RNWE.
2. RELATED WORK
In this work we consider how having stochastic delays and risk-averse users influence the traditional
competitive network game introduced by Wardrop (1952). He postulated that the prevailing traffic conditions
can be determined from the assumption that users jointly select shortest routes, and the mathematics that
go with this idea were formalized in an influential book by Beckmann et al. (1956) where they lay out the
foundations to analyze network games. These models find applications in various application domains such
as in transportation (Sheffi 1985) and telecommunications (Altman et al. 2006). In the last decade, these
types of models have received renewed attention with many studies aimed at understanding under what
conditions these games admit an equilibrium, what uniqueness properties are satisfied by these equilibria,
what methods can be used to compute equilibria efficiently, what price is paid for having competition instead
of a centralized solution, and what are good ways to align incentives so an equilibrium becomes socially
optimal. For references on these topics from a perspective similar to ours, we refer the readers to the surveys
(Nisan et al. 2007, Correa and Stier-Moses 2011).
The route-choice model in this paper consists of users that select the path that minimizes the mean plus a
multiple of the variability of travel time (captured by either variance or standard deviation). Exact algorithms
and fully-polynomial approximation schemes have been proposed for this problem and for a more general
risk-averse combinatorial framework by Nikolova et al. (2006b), Nikolova (2010). Approximation algo-
rithms for other risk-averse combinatorial frameworks were provided by Nikolova et al. (2006a), Swamy
(2011), Li and Deshpande (2011). We refer the reader to these papers for a more extensive list of references
on risk-averse combinatorial optimization.
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There is a growing literature on stochastic congestion games. Ordo´n˜ez and Stier-Moses (2010) introduce
a game with uncertain delays and risk-averse users and study how the solutions provided by it can be ap-
proximated numerically by an efficient column-generation method that is based on robust optimization. The
main conclusion is that the solutions computed using their approach are good approximations of percentile
equilibria in practice. Here, a percentile equilibrium is a solution in which percentiles of travel times along
flow-bearing paths are minimal. They also use their algorithm to compare equilibria with risk-averse players
to those with risk-neutral players, as in the standard Wardrop model. Nie (2011), who also studies percentile
equilibria, considers an instance with two edges and exogenous standard deviations in detail, provides a
gradient projection algorithm to find percentile equilibria, and uses it to perform a computational study.
Nikolova and Stier-Moses (2014) prove existence and POA results for the exact model we consider here,
when the variability is captured by the standard deviations of latencies. Piliouras et al. (2013) consider the
sensitivity of the price of anarchy to several risk averse user objectives, in a different routing game model
with atomic players and affine latency functions. Angelidakis et al. (2013) also focus on atomic congestion
games with uncertainty induced by stochastic players or stochastic delays, and characterize when equilibria
can be efficiently computed. For other references, we direct the reader to Nikolova and Stier-Moses (2014).
For network and congestion games, a series of papers in the last 15 years have studied the inefficiency
introduced by self-minded behavior. To quantify that inefficiency, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (2009)
computed the supremum over all problem instances of the ratio of the equilibrium cost to the social optimum
cost, which has been called the price of anarchy (POA) by Papadimitriou (2001). The POA has been
analyzed extensively in relation to transportation and telecommunications networks with increasingly more
general assumptions (Roughgarden and Tardos 2002, Roughgarden 2003, Correa et al. 2004, Chau and Sim
2003, Perakis 2007, Correa et al. 2008). Nikolova and Stier-Moses (2014) extended that notion to the case
of stochastic delays with risk-averse players. A different concept, the price of uncertainty, was considered in
congestion games in reference to how best response dynamics change under randomness introduced by an
adversary and random ordering of players (Balcan et al. 2009). Risk aversion in the algorithmic game theory
literature has been considered recently in the context of general games (e.g., Fiat and Papadimitriou (2010)
who focus on hardness results) and mechanism design (e.g., Dughmi and Peres (2012), Fu et al. (2013),
Dughmi (2014)).
3. THE MODEL
We consider a directed graph G = (V,E) with a single source-sink pair (s, t) and an aggregate demand
of d units of flow that need to be routed from s to t. We let P be the set of all feasible paths between s and
t. We encode players decisions as a flow vector f = (fp)p∈P ∈ R|P|+ over all paths. Such a flow is feasible
when demand is satisfied, as given by the constraint
∑
p∈P fp = d. For notational simplicity, we denote the
flow on a directed edge e by fe =
∑
p∋e fp. When we need multiple flow variables, we use the analogous
notation x, xp, xe and z, zp, ze.
The network is subject to congestion, modeled with stochastic delay functions ℓe(fe) + ξe(fe) for each
edge e ∈ E. Here, ℓe(fe) measures the expected delay when the edge has flow fe, and ξe(fe) is a random
variable that represents a noise term on the delay, encoding the error that ℓe(·) makes. Functions ℓe(·),
generally referred to as latency functions, are assumed continuous and non-decreasing. The expected latency
along a path p is given by ℓp(f) :=
∑
e∈p ℓe(fe).
Random variables ξe(fe) have expectation equal to zero and standard deviation equal to σe(fe), for
arbitrary continuous functions σe(·). We assume that these random variables are pairwise independent.
From there, the variance along a path equals vp(f) =
∑
e∈p σ
2
e(fe), and the standard deviation (stdev) is
σp(f) = (vp(f))
1/2
. We will initially work with variances and then extend the model to standard devia-
tions, which have the complicating square roots. (For details on the complications, we refer the reader to
Nikolova and Stier-Moses (2014)).
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We will consider the nonatomic version of the routing game where infinitely many players control an
infinitesimal amount of flow each so that the path choice of a single player does not unilaterally affect the
costs experienced by other players (even though the joint actions of players affect other players).
As explained in the introduction, players are risk-averse and hence choose paths taking into account the
variability of delays. We follow the literature and perturb the mean delay of path p with a factor of the
variance:
Qγp(f) = ℓp(f) + γvp(f). (1)
This objective function will be referred to as the mean-var objective, and frequently simply as the path cost
(as opposed to latency). Here, γ ≥ 0 is a constant that quantifies the risk-aversion of the players, which we
assume homogeneous. The special case of γ = 0 corresponds to risk-neutrality.
The variability of delays is usually not too large with respect to the expected latency. It is common to
consider the coefficient of variability CVe(fe) := σe(fe)/ℓ(fe) given by the ratio of the standard deviation
to the expectation as a relative measure of variability. In this case, we consider the variance-to-mean ratio
ve(fe)/ℓ(fe) as a relative measure of variability. Consequently, we assume that ve(xe)/ℓe(xe) is bounded
from above by a fixed constant κ for all e ∈ E at the equilibrium flow xe ∈ R+. This means that the
variance cannot be larger than κ times the expected latency in any edge at the equilibrium flow.
In summary, an instance of the problem in given by the tuple (G, d, ℓ, v, γ), which represents the topology,
the demand, the latency functions, the variability functions, and the degree of risk-aversion of players.
The following definition captures that at equilibrium players route flow along paths with minimum cost
Qγp(·). In essence, users will switch routes until at equilibrium costs are equal along all used paths. This is
the natural extension of the traditional Wardrop Equilibrium to risk-averse users.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). A γ-equilibrium of a stochastic nonatomic routing game is a flow f such that
for every k ∈ K and for every path p ∈ Pk with positive flow, the path cost Qγp(f) ≤ Qγq (f) for any other
path q ∈ Pk . For a fixed risk-aversion parameter γ, we refer to a γ-equilibrium as a risk-averse Wardrop
equilibrium (RAWE) and denote it by x.
Notice that since the variance decomposes as a sum over all the edges that form the path, the previous
definition represents a standard Wardrop equilibrium with respect to modified costs ℓe(fe) + γve(fe). For
the existence of the equilibrium, it is sufficient that the modified cost functions are increasing.
Our goal is to investigate the effect that risk-averse decision-makers have on the quality of equilibria.
The quality of a solution that represents collective decisions can be quantified by the cost of equilibria with
respect to expected delays since, over time, different realizations of delays average out to the mean by the
law of large numbers. For this reason, a social planner, who is concerned about the long term, is typically
risk neutral, as opposed to users who tend to be more emotional about decisions. Furthermore, the social
planner may aim to reduce long-term emissions, which would be better captured by the total expected delay
of all users. These arguments justify the difference between the risk aversion coefficient that characterizes
user behavior at equilibrium and the behavior of the social planner.
Definition 2. The social cost of a flow f is defined as the sum of the expected latencies of all players:
C(f) :=
∑
p∈P
fpℓp(f) =
∑
e∈E
feℓe(fe). (2)
Although one could have measured total cost as the weighted sum of the costs Qγp(f) of all users, this
captures users’ utilities but not the system’s benefit. Although one can consider such a cost function to
compute the price of anarchy (see Nikolova and Stier-Moses (2014)), in the current paper our goal is to
compare across different values of risk aversion so we want the various flow costs to be measured in the
same unit.
The following definition captures the increase in social cost at equilibrium introduced by user risk-
aversion, compared to the cost one would have if users were risk-neutral. Hence, we use a risk-neutral
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Wardrop equilibrium (RNWE), defined as a 0-equilibrium according to Definition 1, as the yardstick to de-
termine the inefficiency caused by risk-aversion. We define the price of risk aversion as the worst-case ratio
among all possible instances of expected costs of the risk-averse and risk-neutral equilibria.
Definition 3. Consider a family of instances F of a routing game with uncertain delays. The price of risk
aversion (PRA) associated with the risk-aversion coefficient γ is defined by
PRA(F , γ) := sup
G,d,ℓ,v:(G,d,ℓ,v,γ)∈F
C(x)
C(z)
, (3)
where x and z are the RAWE and the RNWE of the corresponding instance.
Intuitively, this ratio would depend on the topology of the instance G, on the risk-aversion coefficient γ,
and on the degree of the variability of delays κ. We present the following example to motivate the form of
the bound to the PRA, which is going to be linear both in γ and in κ. The example is based on a simple
network with two edges, usually referred to as the Pigou network (Pigou 1920, Roughgarden and Tardos
2002).
Example 3.1. Consider an instance with two nodes connected by two parallel edges with latencies equal
to (1 + γκ)x and 1, respectively, and variances equal to v1 = 0 and v2 = κ. The total demand is a unit.
Computing equilibria, the RNWE flow routes 1/(1 + γκ) units along the first edge and γκ/(1 + γκ) along
the second. This gives a total cost of 1. Instead, the RAWE flow routes all the flow along the first edge, which
gives a total cost of 1 + γκ. Dividing, we get that PRA≥ 1 + γκ.
The previous example motivates the need of imposing an upper bound on the variability of delays.
Remark 3.2. Taking κ→∞ in the previous example, it follows that if one does not constrain variability of
delays, the price of risk aversion is unbounded.
Having bounded variability is a reasonable assumption in real-life transportation networks since the vari-
ability is never too many times larger than the expected latency of an edge. Moreover, the more congested
the network is, the less variable delays are since speeds approach zero and hence the possibilities of variation
are minimal. In the following section, we shall prove that 1 + γκ is a matching upper bound for instances
with the topology of Pigou networks. Indeed, we will see that this will be a special case of a result for
general topologies.
4. PRA IN GENERAL GRAPHS
We first generalize the lower bound given in the previous section to suggest what one can expect in general
and then find an upper bound to the price of risk aversion (PRA).
4.1. A lower bound on the PRA for the Braess graph. We exhibit a family of instances with the topol-
ogy of a Braess network (Braess 1968, Roughgarden and Tardos 2002) where the PRA tends to 1 + 2γκ,
establishing that lower bound.
Example 4.1. Consider the symmetric Braess network instance in Figure 1. We refer to the top path as p,
which consists of edges (a, b). Similarly, we refer to the bottom path as q, which consists of edges (c, d).
Last, we refer to the zigzag path as r, which consists of edges (a, e, d). Latencies are given by ℓa(x) =
ℓd(x) = αx, ℓb(x) = ℓc(x) = 1 and ℓe(x) = β + v, and edge variances by va(x) = vd(x) = ve(x) = 0
and vb(x) = vc(x) = v. Further, we set γ = 1 and κ = v so that γκ = v. These definitions verify that the
variance-to-mean ratio is bounded by κ.
• First, we compute the risk-averse equilibrium x. To do that, we set all path costs to be equal at
equilibrium. By symmetry, it is enough that Qγp(x) = Qγr (x), which is equivalent to:
ℓa(xa) + ℓb(xb) + γvp = ℓa(xa) + ℓe(xe) + ℓd(xd)⇔ ℓb(xb) + γvp = ℓa(xa) + ℓe(xe).
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(1, v)
(1, v)
(β + v, 0)1 1
(αx, 0)
(αx, 0)
FIGURE 1. Braess instance corresponding to Example 4.1. Edges are labeled with (mean,
variance) pairs.
Using the structure of Braess, xa = 1 − xp, thus from above 1 + v = α(1 − xp) + β + v, which
simplifies to 1 + αxp = α+ β. We will ensure that xr = 1 (that is, the zigzag path carries all flow)
is an equilibrium. In that case, α + β = 1, so we set β = 1 − α. Therefore, the social cost of the
risk-averse equilibrium is C(x) = ℓr(x) = 2α+ β + v = α+ v + 1.
• Next, let us compute the risk-neutral equilibrium z. Proceeding as before, we need that ℓp(z) =
ℓr(z), which is equivalent to:
ℓa(za) + ℓb(zb) = ℓa(za) + ℓe(ze) + ℓd(za)⇔ 1 = β + v + α(1 − zp).
After some algebra, we get that zp = v/α. Since zp ∈ [0, 1/2] by construction, α ≥ 2v. The social
cost of the risk-neutral equilibrium is C(z) = ℓp(z) = α(1 − v/α) + 1 = α− v + 1.
• Putting it all together, the PRA is
C(x)
C(z)
=
α+ 1 + v
α+ 1− v
.
To see how this ratio depends on γκ, we set it equal to 1 + hγκ = 1 + hv and solve for h. Indeed,
hv =
α+ 1 + v
α+ 1− v
− 1 =
2v
α+ 1− v
,
from where h = 2/(α+1− v). To conclude that a lower bound for the PRA for the Braess instance
is 1 + 2γκ, we see that h→ 2 as v → 0 when α = 2v.
Summarizing the previous example, at the end the worst-case instance is parameterized only by v. Laten-
cies are given by ℓa(x) = ℓd(x) = 2vx, ℓb(x) = ℓc(x) = 1 and ℓe(x) = 1−v. The RNWE is zp = zq = 1/2
with cost C(z) = ℓp(z) = 1+ v, and the RAWE is xr = 1 with cost C(x) = ℓr(x) = 1+ 3v. Dividing, we
get that the PRA is lower bounded by 1 + 2v/(v + 1). Hence, the worst-case bound of 1 + hγκ is achieved
when v = κ→ 0 and in that case h→ 2.
Having presented this lower bound on the PRA, we next derive an upper bound for general networks and
in the process we show that it is tight for Braess instances.
4.2. An upper bound on the PRA for general graphs. We start by introducing bounds on the latency
of the risk-averse Wardrop equilibrium (RAWE), which we will use to find the PRA. As before, we let z
denote the risk-neutral Wardrop equilibrium (RNWE) and let x denote the RAWE. It is well-known that,
by definition, the social cost C(z) of a RNWE can be upper-bounded by the latency ℓp(z) of an arbitrary
path p ∈ P, and the bound is tight if the path carries flow. We now extend that argument to a RAWE. We
prove that its social cost is bounded by the cost Qp(z) of an arbitrary path p ∈ P . As a corollary, C(z)
is also bounded by the expected latency of an arbitrary path, blown up by a constant that depends on the
risk-aversion coefficient γ and the maximum coefficient of variation κ.
Lemma 4.2. Consider an arbitrary network instance with general latencies and variance functions. Letting
p ∈ P denote an arbitrary path (potentially not carrying flow at equilibrium), the social cost of a RAWE
C(x) is upper bounded by the path cost Qp(x).
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Proof. From the equilibrium conditions, we have that ℓq(x)+ γvq(x) ≤ ℓp(x)+ γvp(x) for all paths q ∈ P
that carry positive flow. Therefore,
C(x) =
∑
q∈P
xqℓq(x) ≤
∑
q∈P
xq [ℓp(x) + γvp(x)− γvq(x)]
=ℓp(x) + γvp(x)− γ
∑
q∈P
xqvq(x)
≤ℓp(x) + γvp(x) = Qp(x).
Here, we have used the equilibrium condition, and removed a negative term. 
Corollary 4.3. Consider a general instance with a single source-sink pair, general latencies and general
variance functions that satisfy that the variance-to-mean ratio at equilibrium is bounded by κ. Letting p ∈ P
denote an arbitrary path (potentially not carrying flow at equilibrium), the social cost C(x) of a RAWE x is
upper bounded by (1 + γκ)ℓp(x).
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 4.2 by noting that the mean-var cost of a path is bounded as follows:
Qp(x) = ℓp(x) + γ
∑
e∈p
ve(xe) ≤ ℓp(x) + γ
∑
e∈p
κℓe(xe) ≤ ℓp(x)(1 + γκ),
by the assumption that ve(xe) ≤ κℓe(xe) for all edges e ∈ E at the equilibrium x. 
To get the tightest possible upper bound, one would consider the shortest path with respect to the variances
induced by the RAWE. Selecting a specific path, we can get rid of the γκ factor and bound the total cost by
the expected latency of that particular path, as established in the next lemma.
Lemma 4.4. Consider a general instance with a single source-sink pair, general latencies and general
variance functions. Letting p ∈ P denote the path that minimizes the variance under a RAWE x (where the
path p may or may not carry flow), the social cost C(x) is upper bounded by ℓp(x).
Proof. Let the path p := argmin{vq : q ∈ P} be the path with least variability among those used in a
risk-averse equilibrium. Using the first inequality of Lemma 4.2 and that vp(x) ≤ vq(x) for all q ∈ P, we
have that C(x) ≤ ℓp(x) + γ
∑
q∈P xq(vp(x)− vq(x)) ≤ ℓp(x). 
We proceed to bound the price of risk aversion on a general graph by an appropriate construction of an
alternating path that contains edges from the following two sets, which form a partition of the edges in E:
A ={e ∈ E | ze ≥ xe and ze > 0}
B ={e ∈ E | ze < xe or ze = xe = 0}
We will assume from here on that edges in B satisfy ze < xe since edges that carry no flow in both
equilibria (ze = xe = 0) can be removed from the graph without loss of generality. If there is a full s-t path
π contained in the set A, then it is not too hard to prove that C(x) ≤ (1 + γκ)C(z). In other words, this
would give the lowest possible PRA bound of 1 + γκ. We will now prove that this bound can be extended
to alternating paths in G, which are paths from s to t consisting of edges in A plus reversed edges in B. We
shall refer to edges on the alternating path that belong to A as forward edges and those in B as backward
edges.
Definition 4. We say that a path π := (e1, . . . , er) from s to t is alternating if reversing the direction of
edges in B makes it a feasible s-t path.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of the alternating path definition (in bold) where reversing edges in B
creates a feasible path. The following existence proof follows from flow conservation and the definitions of
sets A and B.
Lemma 4.5. An alternating path exists.
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FIGURE 2. Part of an alternating path. Labels denote the names of subpaths used in this section.
Proof. We give a constructive proof that such a path exists by showing that any s-t cut in G must have either
a forward edge in A or a backward edge in B.
We consider any s-t cut defined by S ⊂ V with s ∈ S and prove that we can cross it with an edge in A
or a reverse edge in B. Suppose the contrary, namely that all edges incoming to S are in A and all edges
outgoing from S are inB. Denote by xA and zA the total incoming flow into S corresponding to flow vectors
x and z, respectively, and by xB and zB the total outgoing flows from S respectively. The definition of set
A implies that xA ≤ zA. Since conservation of flow imposes that xB − xA = zB − zA, we have xB ≤ zB .
On the other hand, from the definition of B, either xB > zB (note, we removed edges with xe = ze = 0),
which is a contradiction.
Now, starting with the cut (S,G\S) where S = {s}, we find an appropriate edge crossing the cut and
move both of its endpoints to S. Thus, we add nodes to S one by one until all nodes are in S, at which point
we will have a tree of forward and backward edges containing all nodes. This tree yields an alternating path
from the source to the destination. 
We use the alternating path to provide an upper bound on the PRA that depends on the number of times
the alternating path switches from A to B. To get there, we need two lemmas. The first lemma extends
Corollary 4.3, which applies to (standard) paths, to the case of alternating paths. Note that it allows us to
tighten the previous bound by subtracting the latencies of the backward edges in the alternating path. The
lemma provides an upper bound on the social cost of the RAWE x by exploiting the equilibrium conditions
on the subpaths Bi on the alternating path with respect to the risk-averse objective.
Lemma 4.6. Consider an arbitrary graph with general latencies and general variance functions that satisfy
that the variance-to-mean ratio at equilibrium is bounded by κ. Letting π be an alternating path, the social
cost C(x) of a RAWE x is upper bounded by
(1 + γκ)
∑
e∈A∩π
ℓe(xe)−
∑
e∈B∩π
ℓe(xe) .
Proof. Let us assume that the alternating path consists of subpaths A1B1A2 . . . Aη−1Bη−1Aη, where each
subpath is in the corresponding set A or B. Since by definition each edge e in Bk carries flow (xe > 0) for
any k, e must belong to a flow-carrying s-t path. Selecting a decomposition where the whole subpath Bk is
on the same path (we have the freedom to do that since this is a standard Wardrop model with respect to the
mean-variance objective), there must be a flow-carrying path that consists of subpaths CkBkDk where Ck
originates at the source node and Dk terminates at the destination node (see Figure 2 for an illustration). We
define C0 = Dn = ∅. To simplify notation, only for the proof of this lemma, we are going to refer to the
mean-variance cost of subpath P also by P =
∑
e∈P (ℓe(xe) + γve(xe)).
We next use the equilibrium conditions to derive bounds on Ck and Dk. Since the subpath CkBk carries
flow and the subpath Ck−1Ak is an alternative route between the endpoints ofCkBk, we have that Ck+Bk ≤
Ck−1+Ak for all k. Note that here and in what follows we critically use the additivity of the mean-variance
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cost. Therefore,
Ck ≤ Ck−1 +Ak −Bk (4)
≤ Ck−2 +Ak−1 +Ak − (Bk−1 +Bk)
. . .
≤ (A1 +A2 + . . . +Ak)− (B1 +B2 + . . .+Bk)
Similarly, since BkDk carries flow and Ak+1Dk+1 is an alternative route between the same endpoints, we
have that Bk +Dk ≤ Ak+1 +Dk+1 for all k. Therefore,
Dk ≤ Ak+1 +Dk+1 −Bk (5)
≤ Ak+1 +Ak+2 +Dk+2 − (Bk +Bk+1)
. . .
≤ (Ak+1 +Ak+2 + . . .+An)− (Bk +Bk+1 + . . .+Bn−1)
Then, for path q = CkBkDk for any k, we have that
C(x) =
∑
p
xpℓp(x)
≤
∑
p
xp(ℓq(x) + γvq(x)− γvp(x)) because either xp = 0 or Qp(x) ≤ Qq(x)
≤CkBkDk after neglecting the negative term
≤(A1 + . . .+An)− (B1 + . . .+Bn−1) using inequalities (4) and (5)
≤
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈Ai
(ℓe(xe) + γve(xe))−
n−1∑
i=1
∑
e∈Bi
ℓe(xe) neglecting variances in the negative term
≤
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈Ai
(ℓe(xe) + γκℓe(xe))−
n−1∑
i=1
∑
e∈Bi
ℓe(xe) applying the variability bound on the variances.
The claim follows. 
The previous result provided an upper bound for the RAWE x. Now, we complement it with a lower
bound for the RNWE z. Again, to get the result we exploit the equilibrium conditions, now with respect to
ℓ(·).
Lemma 4.7. Consider a general instance with a single source-sink pair, general latencies and general
variance functions. Letting π be an alternating path, the social cost of a RNWE z satisfies:
C(z) ≥
∑
e∈A∩π
ℓe(ze)−
∑
e∈B∩π
ℓe(ze) .
Proof. Since ze > 0 for any e ∈ Ak, there must be a subpath Ck−1 that brings flow to Ak (this Ck−1 need
not be the same as that used in the proof of Lemma 4.6). Then, there is a flow decomposition in which the
subpath Ck−1Ak is used by z. Because subpath CkBk is an alternative route from s to the node at the end
of Ak, we must have that ℓCk−1(z) + ℓAk(z) ≤ ℓCk(z) + ℓBk(z). Summing the previous inequalities for all
k (where C0 is defined as an empty path), we get
ℓCn−1(z) ≥
n−1∑
k=1
(ℓAk(z)− ℓBk(z)) .
This proves the lemma because C(z) = ℓCn−1(z)+ℓAn(z), since Cn−1An is a flow-carrying path for z. 
With the previous two lemmas that provided bounds for x and z and the sets A and B that allow us to
compare both flows, the proof of the main result consists of just chaining the inequalities.
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FIGURE 3. Operations used to construct a series-parallel graph.
Theorem 4.8. Consider a general instance with a single source-sink pair, general latencies and general
variance functions that satisfy that the variance-to-mean ratio at equilibrium is bounded by κ. Letting π
be an alternating path, the price of risk aversion is upper bounded by 1 + γκη, where η is the number of
disjoint forward subpaths in the alternating path π. In other words,
C(x) ≤ (1 + γκη)C(z).
Proof.
C(x) ≤(1 + γκ)
∑
e∈A∩π
ℓe(x)−
∑
e∈B∩π
ℓe(x) by Lemma 4.6
≤(1 + γκ)
∑
e∈A∩π
ℓe(z)−
∑
e∈B∩π
ℓe(z) by definition of A and B
≤C(z) + γκ
∑
e∈A∩π
ℓe(z) by Lemma 4.7
≤C(z) + γκηC(z)
= (1 + γκη)C(z) .
Here, we have used that
∑
e∈A∩π ℓe(z) ≤ ηC(z). This holds because for all forward subpaths Ak ∈ π, their
edges satisfy ze > 0 so ℓAk(z) ≤ ℓq(z) = C(z) for some path q with zq > 0 that includes the subpath Ak.
(The latter holds because any path flow decomposition is valid for the risk-neutral equilibrium.) 
The coefficient η, referred to in the introduction, is the maximum possible number of disjoint forward
subpaths. By way of construction, an alternating path goes through every node at most once and the number
of forward subpaths is maximized when the path consists of alternating forward and backward edges, for a
total of at most n− 1 edges. Therefore η ≤ ⌈|π|/2⌉ ≤ ⌈(n− 1)/2⌉.
Corollary 4.9. The price of risk aversion in a general graph is upper bounded by 1 + γκ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉.
The bound depends on the three factors that one would expect (risk aversion, variability and network size),
but perhaps unexpectedly does so in a linear way and for arbitrary delay and variance functions. Applying
Theorem 4.8 to the Braess graph used in Example 4.1 (see Figure 1), we can see that for that family the
bound provided by the main theorem is tight.
Corollary 4.10. The price of risk aversion among all instances whose topology is a Braess graph is exactly
1 + 2γκ.
Proof. The proof follows directly noting that n = 4 for the Braess graph. Here, we give more details on the
alternating path and resulting PRA, to give more insight into the problem. There are four possibilities for
an alternating path π: the three (regular) s-t paths and the alternating path consisting of two forward edges
(b and c in the example) and one backward edge (e in the example). The first cases consist of forward edges
only, so when any of those paths is in A, the bound for the price of risk aversion would be 1 + γκ. The
‘bad case’ is when π is the alternating path with one backward edge. In that case, the alternating path has
two non-adjacent forward edges, providing the matching upper bound to the example. This implies that the
value of the PRA is exact. 
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Next, we derive that the price of risk aversion in series-parallel graphs is at most 1 + γκ, independently
of the size of the network. Given the lower bound provided by Example 3.1 (a Pigou graph is series-
parallel), this bound must be tight. Series-parallel graphs are those formed recursively by subdividing an
edge in two subedges, or replacing an edge by two parallel edges (see Figure 3). A noteworthy alternative
characterization is that a graph is series-parallel if and only if it does not contain a Braess subgraph as an
induced minor.
Corollary 4.11. The price of risk aversion among all series-parallel instances is exactly 1 + γκ.
Proof. We are going to prove that there exists an alternating path π consisting only of forward edges, so
π ⊆ A. Let us consider a minimal (cardinality-wise) alternating path with a backward edge. The key
property of series-parallel graphs is that after taking a reverse edge e−, where e = (i, j) ∈ E, π has to either
come back to node j or close a loop with itself. If that did not happen, it would imply that a Braess graph is
embdeded in the instance, which is not possible. Hence, there is an alternating path π′ without the reverse
edge e−, which is a contradiction to the minimality of π. 
5. REPRESENTING RISK AS THE STANDARD DEVIATION
We now consider a related risk measure based on the standard deviation rather than the variance. The
objective that each user seeks to minimize is a linear combination of the expectation and the standard devi-
ation along a route. We call that the mean-standard deviation (mean-stdev) objective. For simplicity, in the
rest of this section we refer to the mean-stdev objective as the risk-averse cost along a route. Formally, the
mean-stdev cost along route p is
Qγp(f) =
∑
e∈p
ℓe(fe) + γ
√∑
e∈p
σe(fe)2 . (6)
For this objective, equilibrium existence follows from a variational inequality formulation if standard devi-
ation functions σ(x) are continuous, as we have assumed here Nikolova and Stier-Moses (2014).
Example 3.1 and Remark 3.2 for the mean-var model can be adapted here, replacing the variances with
standard deviations in the example specification. Since for arbitrary instances the PRA is unbounded, we
assume that σe(xe)/ℓe(xe) is no more than a fixed constant κσ for all e ∈ E at the RAWE xe ∈ R+ (this
is less restrictive than requiring such a bound for all feasible flows). This means that the standard deviation
cannot be larger than κσ times the expected latency in any edge at the equilibrium flow.
We start by identifying which results extend from the mean-var model to the mean-stdev model here. Es-
sentially all lemmas extend, except for Lemma 4.6. Proving this lemma is thus the only remaining roadblock
to proving the equivalent of Theorem 4.8 in the case of the mean-stdev cost, namely establishing a price of
risk aversion bound for general graphs.
For completeness, we restate the lemmas and some of the proofs that require a slight modification. By
the definition of equilibrium, the cost C(z) of a RNWE can be bounded by the latency ℓp(z) of an arbitrary
path p, and both are equal if zp > 0. We now extend that argument to a RAWE x. We prove that its total
cost is bounded by the expected latency of an arbitrary path, blown up by a constant that depends on the
risk-aversion coefficient and the maximum coefficient of variation.
Lemma 5.1. Consider a general instance with a single source-sink pair and general latencies and standard
deviation functions. Letting p ∈ P denote an arbitrary path (potentially not carrying flow at equilibrium),
the social cost of a RAWE C(x) is bounded by the path cost Qp(x).
Corollary 5.2. Consider a general instance with a single source-sink pair, general latencies and general
standard deviation functions that satisfy that the coefficient of variation at equilibrium is bounded by κσ.
Letting p ∈ P denote an arbitrary path (potentially not carrying flow at equilibrium), the social cost C(x)
of a RAWE x is bounded by (1 + γκσ)ℓp(x).
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Proof. From Lemma 5.1,
C(x) ≤ Qp(x) =ℓp(x) + γ
√∑
a∈p
σ2a(x)
≤ℓp(x) + γ
∑
a∈p
σa(x)
≤ℓp(x) + γ
∑
a∈p
κσℓa(x) = ℓp(x)(1 + γκσ) .
Here, we have used that ||x||2 ≤ ||x||1 for an arbitrary nonnegative vector, and applied the bound of κσ on
the coefficient of variation. 
As in the mean-var case, to get the tightest possible upper bound, one would consider the path with
smallest standard deviation induced by the RAWE. Selecting that path, we can get rid of the factor and
bound the total cost by the expected latency of the path.
Lemma 5.3. Consider a general instance with a single source-sink pair, general latencies and general
standard deviation functions. Letting p ∈ P denote the path that minimizes the standard deviation under a
RAWE x (where the path p may or may not carry flow), the social cost C(x) is bounded by ℓp(x).
Let us note that an alternating path exists using the same proof as that of Lemma 4.5, even though the
corresponding sets A and B will be different reflecting that x is now a RAWE for the mean-stdev cost. We
now prove a special case of Theorem 4.8 for the mean-stdev model, namely that if we can find an alternating
path in the set A, then PRA in the mean-stdev model is 1 + γκσ .
Theorem 5.4. Consider a general instance with a single source-sink pair, general latencies and gen-
eral standard deviation functions that satisfy that the stdev-to-mean ratio at equilibrium is bounded by
κσ. Suppose there exists an alternating path p consisting of forward edges only (namely edges in the set
A = {e ∈ E | ze ≥ xe and ze > 0}. Then, the price of risk aversion is upper bounded by 1 + γκσ . In other
words,
C(x) ≤ (1 + γκσ)C(z).
Proof. Since p ⊆ A is composed of only forward edges, it is an s-t path, which allows us to apply Corol-
lary 5.2. Lemma 4.7 also holds since it concerns the RNWE z, which does not depend on how risk aversion
is captured by the model. The rest of the proof follows as before:
C(x) ≤(1 + γκσ)
∑
e∈p
ℓe(xe) by Corollary 5.2
≤(1 + γκσ)
∑
e∈p
ℓe(ze) by monotonicity of the latency functions, and since path p ⊆ A
≤ (1 + γκσ)C(z) by Lemma 4.7 .

Extending Lemma 4.6 to the mean-stdev objective for general graphs remains elusive. The proof for the
mean-var objective relies on the equilibrium conditions on subpaths of the RAWE x. Although the mean-
var objective leads to a separable model, the mean-stdev one does not (for details, we refer the reader to
Nikolova and Stier-Moses (2014)), and that complicates a general proof. Moreover, as an additional com-
plication, in the variance case we use a flow decomposition that suits our needs but for the standard deviation
case, the decompositions cannot be arbitrary Nikolova and Stier-Moses (2014) so we cannot guarantee that
the one we need is valid. As some preliminary steps to a general proof, the next two sections provide tight
bounds for PRA in two well-studied families of graphs: Braess networks and series-parallel networks.
14
5.1. PRA in the Braess Network. In this section we consider Braess paradox networks (see Figure 1) with
a unit demand. We use the same notation as within Example 4.1.
We will show that a slight modification of our proof for the mean-variance cost function in general graphs
can provide a proof for the mean-stdev cost function in the Braess graph, and we comment on the challenge
of extending such a proof to a mean-stdev cost function in general graphs. In what follows, we will prove a
version of Lemma 4.6 for the mean-stdev in the Braess graph and consequently we will get that the PRA is
1 + 2γκσ . We start with an auxiliary lemma. As before, we denote the top path by p, consisting of edges
(a, b); the bottom path by q, consisting of edges (c, d), and the zigzag path by r, consisting of edges (a, e, d).
Lemma 5.5. For an arbitrary flow f in a Braess network, σp(f) + σq(f)− σr(f) ≤ σb(fb) + σc(fc) when
σr(f) ≤ max(σp(f), σq(f)).
Proof. To simplify notation and since the flow f does not play a role in the proof, we are going to suppress
the dependence on f of the standard deviation functions. The inequality we wish to prove is equivalent to√
σ2a + σ
2
b +
√
σ2c + σ
2
d ≤ σb + σc +
√
σ2a + σ
2
e + σ
2
d .
Squaring and rearranging terms, it is also equivalent to
2
√
(σ2a + σ
2
b )(σ
2
c + σ
2
d) ≤ 2σbσc + σ
2
e + 2(σb + σc)
√
σ2a + σ
2
e + σ
2
d.
Finally, squaring once more, we get
σ2aσ
2
d ≤
σ4e
4
+ σbσcσ
2
e + σ
2
aσ
2
b + σ
2
cσ
2
d + 2σbσc(σ
2
a + σ
2
e + σ
2
d)+
σ2e(σ
2
b + σ
2
c ) + (2σbσc + σ
2
e)(σb + σc)
√
σ2a + σ
2
e + σ
2
d .
If σp ≥ σr, the last inequality holds because σ2a + σ2b ≥ σ2a + σ2e + σ2d, from where σb ≥ σd. The case of
σq ≥ σr is similar. 
We now prove a variant of Lemma 4.6 for the mean-stdev cost on Braess graphs.
Lemma 5.6. Consider a Braess network, general latencies and general standard deviation functions that
satisfy that the coefficient of variation at equilibrium is bounded by κσ. Letting π be an alternating path,
the social cost C(x) of a RAWE x is upper bounded by
(1 + γκσ)
∑
e∈A∩π
ℓe(xe)−
∑
e∈B∩π
ℓe(xe) .
Proof. If π ⊆ A, the result follows from Theorem 5.4. This can happen when π ∈ {p, q, r}. Otherwise
π is the alternating path that consists of edges c, e−, and b. In that case, e ∈ B. Note that ze = xe = 0
cannot hold for e because it is part of the alternating path, so we must have that xe > 0 and consequently
that xr > 0. We must prove that
C(x) ≤ (1 + γκσ)(ℓc(xc) + ℓb(xb))− ℓe(xe) .
Since xr > 0, we have that
ℓr(x) + γσr(x) ≤ ℓp(x) + γσp(x)
⇔ ℓa(x) + ℓe(x) + ℓd(x) ≤ ℓa(x) + ℓb(x) + γ(σp(x)− σr(x))
⇔ ℓd(x) ≤ ℓb(x)− ℓe(x) + γ(σp(x)− σr(x)). (7)
Similarly,
ℓr(x) + γσr(x) ≤ ℓq(x) + γσq(x)
⇔ ℓa(x) + ℓe(x) + ℓd(x) ≤ ℓc(x) + ℓd(x) + γ(σq(x)− σr(x))
⇔ ℓa(x) ≤ ℓc(x)− ℓe(x) + γ(σq(x)− σr(x)). (8)
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If σr(x) ≤ max{σp(x), σq(x)}, then we can apply Lemma 5.5:
C(x) ≤ℓr(x) + γσr(x) by Lemma 5.1
=ℓa(x) + ℓe(x) + ℓd(x) + γσr(x)
≤ℓc(x)− ℓe(x) + γ(σq(x)− σr(x)) + ℓe(x) + ℓb(x)− ℓe(x) + γ(σp(x)− σr(x)) + γσr(x) by (7)-(8)
=ℓc(x) + ℓb(x)− ℓe(x) + γ(σp(x) + σq(x)− σr(x))
≤ℓc(x) + ℓb(x)− ℓe(x) + γ(σb(xb) + σc(xc)) by Lemma 5.5
≤(1 + γκσ)(ℓc(xc) + ℓb(xb))− ℓe(xe),
where the last inequality follows from the coefficient of variability constraint σ(x) ≤ κσℓ(x) for the corre-
sponding edges.
Otherwise, σr(x) > σp(x) and σr(x) > σq(x). Then, inequalities (7) and (8) imply that
ℓb(x) ≥ ℓd(x) + ℓe(x) + γ(σr(x)− σp(x)) ≥ ℓd(x) + ℓe(x) and
ℓc(x) ≥ ℓa(x) + ℓe(x) + γ(σr(x)− σq(x)) ≥ ℓa(x) + ℓe(x).
Summing the above two inequalities, we have: ℓb(x)+ℓc(x) ≥ ℓd(x)+ℓe(x)+ℓa(x)+ℓe(x) = ℓr(x)+ℓe(x).
Therefore,
C(x) ≤ (1 + γκσ)ℓr(x) by Corollary 5.2
≤ (1 + γκσ) (ℓb(x) + ℓc(x)− ℓe(x)) by inequality above
≤ (1 + γκσ) (ℓb(x) + ℓc(x))− ℓe(x).
This completes the proof of this lemma. 
Using Lemma 5.6 in place of Lemma 4.6, we can apply the proof of Theorem 4.8 with the alternating path
π. If π is a path, the PRA is bounded by 1 + γκσ. Otherwise, π consists of edges b, e, c where {b, c} ⊆ A
and e ∈ B and the PRA is bounded by 1 + γκσ⌈(n− 1)/2⌉ = 1 + 2γκσ .
The extension to general networks seems much harder than in the case where the cost is the mean-var
objective because not all flow decompositions are valid.
5.2. Series-Parallel Networks with Single OD and General Latencies. In this section, we consider
series-parallel (SP) networks and provide an analogous result to Corollary 4.11 for the mean-stdev case,
namely that the PRA is (1+γκσ). The extension is straightforward with the tools we have established since
SP networks always possess an alternating path that is a subset of A (see proof of Corollary 4.11) and hence
we can apply Theorem 5.4 to get the following result.
Corollary 5.7. Consider a SP graph with a single source-sink pair, general latencies and general standard
deviations with coefficients of variation bounded by κσ . Then, the PRA is bounded by 1 + γκσ .
The tightness of this bound follows after adapting Example 3.1 to the case of mean-stdev costs.
In the rest of this section, we offer an alternative proof that is of independent interest. This proof sheds
light on the inefficiency of Wardrop equilibria, which has been studied at length in the last 15 years, as
we discuss in the introduction. Our proof establishes that in a SP network the risk-neutral equilibrium z
(equivalently, a standard Wardrop equilibrium) maximizes the shortest-path length among all feasible flows.
This implies that at a risk-neutral equilibrium travelers select paths that are longer in expectation than the
shortest path achieved under any other flow.
The following result provides an upper bound to the PRA proportional on the worst-case ratio between
the shortest expected path latency under a RAWE and that under a RNWE. We remark that this bound also
holds in the mean-var case.
Theorem 5.8. Consider an instance with a single source-sink pair, general latencies and general standard
deviations with coefficients of variation bounded by κσ. Then, the PRA is bounded by (1 + γκσ)ρ, where
ρ := minp ℓp(x)/minq ℓq(z) for a RAWE x and a RNWE z.
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FIGURE 4. A non-SP example where the RNWE does not maximize the shortest path.
Proof. Using Corollary 5.2, we have that C(x)/C(z) ≤ (1 + γκσ)ℓp(x)/minq ℓq(z) for an arbitrary path
p. We get the result by minimizing the expected latency over paths p ∈ P. 
The alternative proof consists in showing that ρ ≤ 1 for SP networks, or minp ℓp(x) ≤ minp ℓp(z). To
simplify notation, we refer to the shortest path with respect to expected latencies corresponding to a feasible
flow f by S(f) := minp∈P ℓp(f). To get the result we now prove that S(f) ≤ S(z) for any feasible flow f .
Theorem 5.9. Consider a RNWE z of a SP network with general latencies and one source-sink pair. Then,
z maximizes S(f) among all feasible flows f .
Proof. We use induction on the construction steps of the SP network. First, let us consider that the last
composition in the construction of the network is series. Because it is a series composition, the restriction of
z to each component is a RNWE for the component. Considering an arbitrary feasible flow f , the induction
implies that the restriction of f to each component cannot have a longer shortest path than the restriction
of z in the same component. We get the desired inequality adding the inequalities corresponding to each
component back together.
Second, let us consider that the last composition in the construction of the network is parallel and de-
note the subcomponents by G1, G2, . . . , Gk . Let us denote by zi and fi the projection of each flow into a
component. There must exist a component i such that fi ≤ zi and zi > 0 because
∑
zi =
∑
fi = 1.
Then, S(f) ≤ S(fi) ≤ S(RNWEGi(fi)) ≤ S(RNWEGi(zi)) = S(z). Here, we have denoted by
RNWEGi(d) the risk-neutral equilibrium in subgraph Gi for demand d. The first inequality is because
S(f) is the minimal shortest path across components, the second is by the inductive hypothesis applied
to the component Gi with demand fi, the third is because increasing demand from fi to zi cannot reduce
the shortest path at equilibrium, and the fourth is because some flow is routed through component i so the
shortest path in that component is equal to the shortest path in the whole graph. 
This argument does not readily extend to non-SP networks since we can sometimes route flow in a worse
way than a Wardrop equilibrium. As an example, take the instance shown in Figure 4 with k horizontal edges
and d = 1. Although the equilibrium loads all horizontal paths equally achieving a shortest path length of
1/k, to maximize the shortest path one can route all flow along the zigzag path achieving a shortest path
of 1. In any case, note that the example above does not preclude the possibility that the PRA is bounded
for non-SP networks. Although S(f) could be high for an arbitrary feasible flow f , it does not imply that
S(x) > S(z). Indeed x is unlikely to use very bad paths because it is at equilibrium for a different objective
function, whereas the bad flow in the zigzag-path example is not an equilibrium for any objective.
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper marks a first step in understanding the consequences on the inefficiency of selfish routing
caused by uncertain edge delays and risk-averse players. We have established an upper bound on the ratio
of the cost of the risk-averse equilibrium to that of the risk-neutral one, for users that aim to minimize the
mean-variance of their route in a general network. We have proved that the bound is tight on series-parallel
and Braess networks. In addition, we have shown that both tight bounds extend to the case where users
minimize the mean-standard deviation of a route instead and have elaborated on the challenges of extending
the analysis to general graphs for users with such risk profiles. Some immediate open questions include: (1)
Is our bound for general graphs tight? (2) Can it be extended to mean-stdev and other risk objectives? (3) Can
the bounds or analysis be extended to heterogeneous risk profiles? Another interesting direction is whether
risk sometimes helps rather than hurts the quality of equilibrium and the social welfare. In particular, can
risk-averse attitudes be leveraged in mechanism design in the place of tolls to reduce congestion?
7. APPENDIX: A PROOF OF THEOREM 5.9 VIA KKT CONDITIONS
Without loss of generality we may consider that the instance has unit demand. Let us consider the
convex optimization problem that maximizes the shortest path objective among feasible flows. Our approach
consists on proving that the optimal objective value is S(z), which by definition of equilibria equals C(z).
In general, the optimal objective value cannot be less than C(z) because z is a feasible solution to problem
below. Although for general networks the optimum can be strictly larger, we will see that this cannot happen
for SP networks. In the following formulation, we denote the dual variables within parenthesis.
min z
− z −
∑
a∈p
ℓa(fa) ≤ 0 ∀p ∈ P (λp)
− fp ≤ 0 ∀p ∈ P (ωp)∑
p∈P
fp − 1 = 0 (µ)
fa −
∑
p:a∈p∈P
fp = 0 ∀a ∈ A (νa)
The problem is written in normal form to facilitate writing the dual. According to the first constraint, −z
is a lower bound to the length of all paths, hence correctly capturing the shortest-path objective. The second
constraint imposes non-negativity of the flow, the third specifies the total demand and the last defines the
flows on edges. The Lagrangian dual is
Λ(z, f, λ, ω, ν, µ) := z −
∑
p∈P
λp(z +
∑
a∈p
ℓa(fa))−
∑
p∈P
ωpfp + µ(
∑
p∈P
fp − 1) +
∑
a∈A
νa(fa −
∑
p:a∈p∈P
fp).
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The stationarity conditions together with dual feasibility are given by the domain∑
a∈p
λaℓ
′
a(fa) ≤ µ ∀p ∈ P (fp)
∑
p∈P
λp = 1 (z)
λa =
∑
p:a∈p∈P
λp ∀a ∈ A
λp ≥ 0, µ free
and the complementary slackness conditions are given by
λp(
∑
a∈p
ℓa(fa)− z) = 0 ∀p ∈ P
fp(µ−
∑
a∈p
λaℓ
′
a(fa)) = 0 ∀p ∈ P .
We find feasible values for z, f , λ, and µ that satisfy primal and dual feasibility, the stationary and the
complementary slackness conditions at the same time. For that purpose, we take f = z, which is primal
feasible. For the dual, we consider the function z(d) that maps a total demand d to the RNWE edge-flow,
which is unique when cost functions are strictly increasing. Using this, we let λp be the marginal increase
in flow along path p when we increase the demand by an infinitesimal. Formally, we let λa := ∂za(1)/∂d
and consider an arbitrary decomposition of the edge flow (λa)a∈A to get λp for all p ∈ P . This definition
automatically gives us dual feasibility because
∑
p∈P λp = 1. This happens because the additional flow has
to be assigned to some path.
What is left is proving that (f, λ) is an optimal primal-dual pair by checking that they satisfy the complementary-
slackness conditions. The first condition holds because a path that is not shortest under a RNWE will not
receive flow if the demand increases by an infinitesimal.
For the second condition, we need to prove that if the RNWE sends flow along a path p then
∑
a∈p λaℓ
′
a(fa)
must be maximal among paths. Let q be a path such that the expression in the previous sentence equals µ
and that additionally has the lowest number of edges with λa = 0. If λa = 0 for all a ∈ q, then µ = 0 and
we are done. Hence, there is at least one a ∈ q such that λa > 0. If there are other edges i ∈ q˜ ⊂ q with
λi = 0, we consider a path r such that λi > 0 for all i ∈ r that maximizes the overlap with q. (Obviously,
r ∩ q˜ = ∅.) Using that the network is series-parallel, we notice that r shortcuts all the subpaths in q˜ and
hence
∑
a∈r λaℓ
′
a(fa) = µ because the terms corresponding to q˜ are zero.
The argument in the previous paragraph allows us to assume that λr > 0 by taking the correct path-
decomposition of (λa)a∈A. Since increasing the total demand increases the flow along r, the cost at equilib-
rium along r must be shortest (even though fr might be zero). Coming back to the second condition, for any
path p ∈ P such that fp > 0, the cost at equilibrium along p must also be shortest and hence the additional
load along both r and p when increasing demand must be equal to µ.
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